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TEE CHARACTERIZATION OF
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
In an effort to regulate the securities market and to prevent
fraudulent transactions, Congress enacted the Securities Act of
19331 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 (the "Acts").
1 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)) [hereinafter "Securities Act"]. The Securities Act governs
primarily the distributorship of first time offered securities to the public and generally re-
quires the registration of all public offerings of securities. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECUR-
rrEs REGULATION 1, 5-7 (1985). The scope of the Securities Act is limited, applying only to
the distribution of securities and the protection of purchasers of securities. Id. at 7.
The legislative history of the Securities Act reveals that congressional entrance into the
field of securities regulation was partially in response to the stock market crash of 1929. See
Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in
Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 86 (1959). Congress recognized that one of the major
causes of the crash was the widespread practice of floating fraudulent securities. See T.
HAZEN, supra, at 6; see also Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171, 171 (1933) (purpose of Securities Act to prevent reoccurrence of the stock market
crash by requiring truthful disclosures at time of securities issue); Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (crash precipi-
tated investigation into stock market).
"A fundamental purpose [of securities regulation] . . . was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
The registration requirements of the Securities Act were designed to insure the ade-
quate disclosure of relevant information upon which rational investment decisions could be
based. See T. HAZEN, supra, at 31; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 92-93
(1983); see generally Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1344-
55 (1966) (discussion of disclosure applicability, requirements, methods, and quality); Doug-
las & Bates, supra, at 187-90 (detailed review of Securities Act's purpose, scope, effect, and
administration); Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1162-64 (1970) (discussing when securities must be registered).
2 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"]. Congress en-
acted the Exchange Act as an additional response to the stock market crash of 1929. See
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 216-17 (1959) (citing SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934)).
The Exchange Act was designed to regulate "all aspects of public trading of securities."
T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 7. To adequately regulate the vast securities industry, Congress
established the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"). See 15
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
In construing the definition of a "security" set forth in these Acts,
courts have encountered difficulty in determining whether a partic-
ular investment or instrument is, in essence, a security.3 The prin-
cipal issue underlying this determination traditionally has been
whether the investment or instrument required the protection of
the federal securities laws.4 Despite the formulation of many dif-
ferent tests and approaches,5 a satisfactory definition of a security
has proven elusive.6 The lack of a consistent and workable defini-
tion of a security has resulted in the failure of the courts to ade-
quately characterize traditional repurchase agreements ("repos")
U.S.C. § 78d (1982). The SEC, in administering its numerous and complex regulations, seeks
to ensure adequate disclosure and due process in the securities field. See Orrick, Organiza-
tion, Procedures and Practices of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 50, 50 (1959). The Exchange Act also prohibits fraud, material misrepresentations,
and omissions of fact in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982); infra note 39.
3 Compare Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (bank-issued certificate of
deposit held not to be a security) and International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 559 (1979) (interest in noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not a security) and
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975) (shares of stock used to
purchase subsidized co-op housing not securities) with Superintendent of Ins. of New York
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971) (treasury bonds held to be securities)
and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345-46 (1967) (withdrawable capital share in sav-
ings and loan association included as a security) and SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
299-300 (1946) (offering of units in citrus grove development combined with agreement to
transfer proceeds directly to investor held a securities transaction).
4 See T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 15. See also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559
(1982) (bank-issued certificate of deposit held not a security for purposes of anti-fraud pro-
visions of securities laws). The Court emphasized that the certificate was already federally
insured and therefore did not require the protection of the securities laws. See id. at 558;
see also Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual Ap-
proach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 329 (1984) (discussing Marine
Bank decision and concepts of securities); Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Definition of
Security, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 99, 137-38 (1982) (same).
See, e.g., Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-53 (economic reality or Howey-Forman test);
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-301 (investment contract or Howey test); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v.
Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (risk capital
analysis), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476,
481-83 (9th Cir.) (modified Howey test with "solely" not strictly construed), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (further discussion of
courts' various tests and approaches). For a more detailed discussion of the struggle for a
workable definition of security, see generally Carney, supra note 4, at 317-73 (satisfying
Howey test may not be a sufficient condition; contextual approach may provide supple-
ment); Carney & Fraser, Defining a "Security" Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital"
Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 78-114 (1981) (risk capital analysis better alternative to inadequate
Howey test).
" See infra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
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in the context of the federal securities laws.7
Early judicial attempts at developing a useful definition of a
security focused primarily upon interpretation of the statutory
phrase "investment contract."8 In a landmark decision, SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.,9 the Supreme Court held that "an investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, trans-
action or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party."' 0 Relying heavily upon the manner in
which the investment was marketed, the Court focused on the eco-
nomic underpinnings of the investment package. 1 Although it has
, See, e.g., United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 300 n.4 (7th Cir.) ("in substance a
secured loan"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (essentially collateralized loans). But see Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (characterization no longer necessary
as repos subject to securities laws), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
- See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (assignments of
oil leases held to involve investment contract); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F.2d
844, 848 (7th Cir. 1937) (bill of sale and delivery contracts to purchase oil royalties held to
be investment contracts); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70, 72-73 (W.D. Ky.
1942) ("An investment contract. . . means the entrusting of money or property to another
with the expectation of profit or income therefrom through the efforts of other persons.")
(citing SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941)).
- 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
10 Id. at 298-99. The Howey Court held that an offering of units of a citrus grove devel-
opment, coupled with a contract for remitting the profits to the investor, was an offering of
an "investment contract" within the meaning of the Securities Act. See id. at 299-300. Con-
sequently, the offering was subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
See id. at 301.
In recent years, the Howey test has not been construed as originally formulated. See,
e.g., Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (dictum) (Court modified Howey test to apply to en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1974) ("solely" requirement of Howey should be construed function-
ally, not literally). The fourth prong of the Howey test, requiring the efforts solely of a third
party, has been altered to include profits received "substantially" from the efforts of others.
See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476,481-83 (9th Cir.) (self-improvement con-
tracts held to be investment contracts even though the profits did not come "solely" from
the efforts of others), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at
16 (recent refinements "diluted" Howey test's "solely" prong).
A further modification of the Howey test required that there be a substantial capital
investment with a corresponding expectation of return for the federal securities laws to be
applicable. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979) (com-
pulsory, noncontributory employee benefit plan not investment contract because economic
realities reveal lack of actual investment). See also Dillport, supra note 4, at 105-06 (modifi-
cations and clarifications of Howey test).
" See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Court, finding that investors were attracted ex-
clusively by the potential for high returns, concluded that this scheme was, in essence, a
profit seeking venture subject to the federal securities laws. See id. at 299-300; T. HAZEN,
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been termed the investment contract test,12 the Howey test may
more accurately be characterized as an economic reality test. 3 In
addition to the Howey test, some state and federal courts devel-
oped a risk capital test. 4 Under this test, an investment is a secur-
ity if there is capital at risk and success is dependent upon the
efforts of others, even if there is no common enterprise nor any
expectation of profit.",
It is submitted, however, that neither the Howey test nor the
risk capital test provides adequate guidelines to determine whether
repurchase agreements are securities within the meaning of the se-
curities laws. These tests are plagued with ambiguities and gener-
alities which make their practical application haphazard at best.
Moreover, the complex nature of the securities field has made it
extremely difficult for the courts to develop a reliable formula.
Consequently, when a court has been called upon to make this de-
termination, it has applied an essentially ad hoc subjective test,
supra note 1, at 15.
12 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The Court, discussing the meaning given investment
contracts by various state courts, defined an investment contract as a "contract or scheme
for 'the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or
profit from its employment.'" Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (quoting State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
13 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). The Court stated that "in
searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." Id. at 336 (citing
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298); see also supra note 11 (emphasis on economic reality in Howey
resulted in classification as security).
"' See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961). In Sobieski, the court noted:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a
security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those who risk
their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ven-
tures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another.
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. See also Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F.
Supp. 1465, 1475 (D. Or. 1985) (risk capital test used to determine whether necessary mone-
tary investment exists to qualify transaction as security); Coffey, The Economic Realities of
a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. REs. L. R.v. 367, 381-83
(1967) (courts should focus on investor's contribution in transaction and risk of losing that
value). But see Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53; see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474
F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (test is whether efforts made by others affect company's success),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
5 See Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1064 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); see also Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River
City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646-47 (D. Colo. 1970) (court limited application of fed-
eral securities laws to extremely high risk, speculative franchises), modified on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). See generally Carney & Fraser, supra note 5, at 96-
114 (overview of risk capital test).
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based largely upon the "economic realities" underlying the invest-
ment, as determined by that particular court.16
This Note will examine whether repos are securities within the
meaning of the securities laws, and will address this issue in light
of the anti-fraud provisions and registration requirements of such
laws. This Note will also consider possible alternative characteriza-
tions of repos and implications of these characterizations on the
repo market and its participants. It will be suggested that courts
should characterize repos in a manner that will exempt them from
the costly and time consuming securities law registration require-
ments, yet subject repo issuers to the anti-fraud provisions of the
Acts.
TRADITIONAL REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND THE REPO MARKET
Commercial repurchase agreements are highly specialized ne-
gotiated contracts, entered into almost exclusively by United
States government securities dealers in order to finance their
highly leveraged operations. 17 The dealer typically will borrow cash
from a corporation or other investor who is searching for a short-
term investment with low risk and a high return. 8 In exchange for
18 Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). In Daniel, the
Supreme Court endorsed the idea that the economic realities of the investment scheme
should be weighed at least equally with, and possibly more than, the structure or the char-
acterization of the scheme adopted by the parties. See id. at 558-59. Accord Howey, 328
U.S. at 298; see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-53 (Court looked to underlying economic
realities rather than form of transactions); Coffey, supra note 14, at 378-80 (scrutinizing all
surrounding circumstances and events to determine true nature of transaction).
17 See J. MARTIN, J. PETTY, A. KEOWN & D. SCOTT, BASIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 167
(2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter J. MARTIN]. Although government securities dealers are the bor-
rowers in the majority of repurchase transactions, commercial banks and thrift institutions
occasionally will attempt to finance their holdings by borrowing in the repo market. See
Snow, Description of the Repo Market and the Positions of the Players, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, REPURCHASE AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 17, 20 (Course Handbook
Series No. 290, 1982) [hereinafter PLI HANDBOOK].
The typical borrowers in repurchase agreements run highly leveraged operations, taking
positions sometimes several hundred times above their capital holdings. See M. STIGUM & R.
BRANCH, MANAGING BANK ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 43-44 (1983). "They will, moreover, buy
and hold substantial positions if they believe that interest rates are likely to fall and that
the value of these securities is therefore likely to rise. Speculation and risk taking are an
inherent and important part of being a dealer." Id. at 43. See also McCurdey, The Dealer
Market for United States Government Securities, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV. 35,
45-47 (Winter 1977-78) (discussion of dealer financing).
" See Snow, supra note 17, at 23-28; Note, Repurchase Agreements and the Bank-
ruptcy Code: The Need for Legislative Action, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 828, 831 (1984). Repur-
chase agreements are relatively safe investments since both the dealer and the issuer of the
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the investor's cash, the dealer agrees to sell and the investor agrees
to buy a specified portion of the dealer's securities at an agreed-
upon price as security for the agreement.1 9 Simultaneously, the
dealer agrees to repurchase and the investor agrees to resell the
same securities at a later date at a specified higher price.20
In the contract, the parties usually will stipulate that any in-
terest accruing on the securities after the initial purchase, but
before the repurchase, will remain the property of the dealer.2" Be-
cause of the economic characteristics of the transaction, repos gen-
erally are perceived by the participants as short-term collateralized
loans.22 In fact, a repurchase agreement is not a transaction in
which securities are being "sold"; 23 rather, the principal economic
result is the formation of secured loans and borrowings.24 The un-
security (the federal government) must default for the investor to suffer a loss. See R.
MOYER, J. MCGUIGAN & W. KRETLOW, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 605 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter R. MOYER]. Additionally, the existence of an agreement to repurchase
removes any marketability risk, since the investor has received a commitment from the
dealer to repay cash at a specified time. See L. GITMAN, M. JOEHNK & G. PINCHES, MANAGE-
RIAL FINANCE 381 (1985).
" See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); J. MARTIN, supra note 17,
at 167. See also B. GuP, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 462 (1983); B. ROSEFSKY,
MONEY TALKS: BOB ROSEFSKY'S COMPLETE PROGRAM FOR FINANCIAL SUCCESS 392 (1982); Se-
curities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No.
IC-13005, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 48,528, at 37,553-23 (Feb. 2, 1983) [here-
inafter Exchange Act Release]; Bowsher, Repurchase Agreements, 61 FED. RESERVE BANK
'OF ST. LOUIS REV. 17, 17-18 (Sept. 1979).
20 See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467. The latter part of this transaction is known as a
reverse repurchase agreement or "reverse repo." See M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 42
(rev. ed. 1983). Nevertheless, a repurchase agreement and a reverse repurchase agreement
are identical transactions. See id. If an investor is seeking cash, he is involved in a repur-
chase agreement. Id. Conversely, if he is seeking securities in exchange for cash, it is a re-
verse transaction. Id.; Bowsher, supra note 19, at 18.
2' Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467. The dealer will continue to receive interest on the securi-
ties, but will have to pay the investor interest on the cash as determined by the repo market
interest rate. See E. SHAPIRO, E. SOLOMON & W. WHr[E, MoNY AND BANKING 323 (5th ed.
1968).
22 See M. STIGUM, supra note 20, at 396; Exchange Act Release, supra note 19, at
37,553-23.
23 M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKEn MYTH, REALITY AND PRACTICE 328 (1978).
24 See id.; R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 687 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter R. BREALEY]. If a repurchase agreement is considered a secured loan to the
borrower, the lender should obtain a perfected security interest in the collateral to protect
himself against the claims of third-party creditors of the borrower. See Hirschberg, Issues
Which Frequently Arise in Structuring and Documenting Commercial Repurchase Trans-
actions, in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 213, 220-21. Note, however, that if the seller
has only an option to repurchase, and not an obligation, then the transaction should not be
considered a secured loan. See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Mehlman, 59 App. Div. 2d
694, 694, 398 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 802, 386 N.E.2d 833, 413
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derlying securities exchanged in the transaction are treated simply
as collateral in the financial markets; the risk of fluctuations in the
value of the securities remains with the dealer even though theo-
retically the investor has title until the subsequent repurchase.25
Although these transactions may resemble ordinary loans,
Federal Reserve Bank regulations treat repos differently from ordi-
nary loans and require the transactions to be structured as sales
and repurchases rather than as straight loans. 26 Repurchase agree-
ments are of limited duration, usually for just one night. They in-
volve enormous sums of money27 and typically are closed by an
oral agreement subject to written confirmation.28 In addition, when
government securities are used to secure the transaction, repos
are exempt from Federal Reserve loan limits and reserve require-
ments.29
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1978). For the guidelines used to determine whether a security interest may
be perfected in securities which are the subject of repurchase agreements, see generally
U.C.C. art. 8; U.C.C. §§ 9-305, 9-312 (1978).
2 See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); M. STIGUM, supra note 23,
at 399-400; see also First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir.
1972) (the lender "is completely insulated from the risk of market fluctuations in this type
of transaction [repo]-its investment is completely secured since it is assured of receiving
the price it paid for the bonds."); United Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d
115, 118 (6th Cir.) (repo characterized as loan because investor/lender assumed no risk,
whereas in a sale, risk of price fluctuations assumed by investor), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827
(1970); American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 452 (5th Cir.) (court character-
ized repo as loan, due to lack of risk for investor), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
26 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1130 (1980) (interpretative rulings on lending limits); id. § 204.123
(1987) (sale of Fed funds by investment companies or trust where entire interest held exclu-
sively by depository institution); id. § 204.124 (1987) (repos involving only Treasury and
Fed securities); see also City of Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463, 469-70
(M.D. Pa. 1985); Lucas, Jones & Thurston, Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements,
FED. RESERVE of N.Y. Q. REV. 33, 33-35 (Summer 1977) [hereinafter Lucas]. Federal funds
transactions are closely related to the development of repos. Lucas, supra, at 34-36. Tradi-
tionally. Federal Reserve member banks have traded their reserve balances as a method of
acquiring capital for investment. See id. at 34. The borrowing bank can thus meets its re-
serve requirements without having to sell its securities, and it can put these securities to use
in other investments. See id.
Except for two minor differences, federal funds are basically indentical to repos. See
Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 469. One difference is that federal bonds can be traded only when
the investor's unsecured loans are exempt from reserve requirements, while repos can be
traded by any investor with sufficient capital. See id. The second difference lies in the eco-
nomic consequences of the two transactions; a federal funds transaction results in an un-
secured loan, while a repo results in a secured loan. See id.
27 See R. BREALEY, supra note 24, at 687; see also Bowsher, supra note 19, at 18 (agree-
ments usually for $500,000 or more).
28 See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
29 See Lucas, supra note 26, at 33-34.
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The major advantages of participating in repo transactions
flow directly from the use of government securities as collateral.30
The investor encounters very little risk that the dealer will refuse
to honor the securities at the time of the repurchase.3 1 On the
other hand, the dealer likes the ease with which the securities can
be transferred.3 2 Most securities are held merely as bookkeep
ing entries at the Federal Reserve Bank, enabling them to be
exchanged over the federal wire without any physical delivery.33
Consequently, repo transactions, which can be completed
very quickly,34 provide sophisticated investors with features
they seek most: liquidity, security, and good returns on their in-
vestments.3 5
Despite the risk of fluctuating market conditions, repurchase
agreements are still regarded as safe investments as long as their
participants remain financially secure.3 1 It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that a government securities dealer may yield to tempta-
tion and make misrepresentations concerning its own financial
well-being or make other fraudulent claims to induce investors to
purchase or sell government securities pursuant to repurchase
See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
" See R. MOYER, supra note 18, at 605. The securities typically utilized in repurchase
transactions are United States government securities, backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States government. See id. For the investor to incur a loss, the government
would have to default on its obligations. See id.
32 See Bowsher, supra note 19, at 18; see also infra text accompanying note 33 (describ-
ing the procedures of a repo transaction).
3 See Bowsher, supra note 19, at 18.
Transactions are negotiated by telephone, either on a direct basis between parties
supplying and acquiring funds or through a small group of market specialists (U.S.
government securities dealers). Most large banks and business firms employ trad-
ers who maintain telephone contact with potential suppliers (or borrowers) of
funds, making offers to borrow (or lend) at specific interest rates.
Id.
I See id.
"I See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Repos, however, do carry
some risks inherent in the trading of all securities. See id. at 472. There is a risk that the
dealer may prove uncreditworthy and default on his obligations to repurchase. See id.; M.
STIGUM, supra note 23, at 399-400. However, repos involve little risk of default because they
have as collateral securities guaranteed by the federal government. See S. Kim & H.
GUITHUES, FINANCE PRINCIPLES: AN INTRODUCTION 250, 251 (1982).
There is also a liquidity risk when giving up cash for securities, Miller, 495 F. Supp. at
472. However, this risk is essentially non-existent because of the limited duration of the
agreement-typically one night. See S. BOLTEN & R. CONN, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL Fi-
NANCE 423 (1982); R. BREALEY, supra note 24, at 687.
11 See supra notes 31 and 35.
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agreements. 7 In anticipation of possible fraud in the securities
field, Congress enacted section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 193338
and section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.-"
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion"), pursuant to section 10(b), promulgated Rule 10b-540 to pro-
tect investors in transactions in which fraud occurred in the offer,
purchase or sale of the security.41 The threat of liability under
these anti-fraud provisions would encourage government securities
dealers to make full and accurate disclosures in all their represen-
tations and provide repo participants with current information
concerning their transactions. 42
" See, e.g., City of Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Pa. 1985)
(misrepresentation based on financial condition of government securities dealer); SEC v.
Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), rev'd, 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894 (1986); SEC v. Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,013,
at 91,019 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1985) (same).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act states, in pertinent
part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities .. di-
rectly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made. . . not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
I 9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states, in pertinent part,
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
40 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). The regulation states, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made. . . not misleading,
or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase and sale of any security.
Id.
4 See supra notes 38-40.
42 Cf. The Issuance of "Retail Repurchase Agreements" by Banks and Savings and
Loan Associations, Securities Act Release No. 6351, Exchange Act Release No. 18122, Trust
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CHARACTERIZATION OF REPOS
For federal security anti-fraud provisions to apply, there must
be a purchase or sale of a "security," and the misrepresentation or
fraud must occur "in connection" with such purchase or sale.43
Consequently, a debate has arisen as to whether to characterize a
repurchase agreement as a loan, as a separate security, or as a
purchase and sale of the securities underlying the agreement."
This Note will examine possible repo characterizations from the
perspective of the SEC and will follow with a discussion of the ju-
diciary's response to this position.
A. Repos as Loans
If repos were characterized as loans, the SEC would not have
regulatory authority over them because the Commission's anti-
fraud jurisdiction is limited to transactions in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, and loans generally do not involve
the use of securities.45 However, an SEC hands-off policy is not
desirable in any government securities transaction fraught with the
potential for widespread fraud. Consequently, the SEC has taken
Indenture Act Release No. 658, Investment Co. Act Release No. 11958, reprinted in 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 2024, 2559-2, 2559-4 to 2559-6 (Sept. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Exchange
Act Release, "Retail Repurchase Agreements'] (banks offering retail repos should accu-
rately disclose all facts regarding repos). See also Note, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty
Over the Repo Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Se-
curities, 37 VAND. L. REV. 401, 424-25 (1984) (potential liability should deter fraud).
4" See supra notes 38-40.
4 See, e.g., SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir.) (fraud "in connection
with" repos governed by anti-fraud provisions), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894 (1986); SEC v.
Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (repos characterized as loans); SEC v. Gomez,
[1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,013, at 91,019 (repos characterized as securities and
thus governed by anti-fraud provisions).
"I See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986); Note, supra note
42, at 416. The anti-fraud provisions apply to separate purchases and sales of underlying
government securities and to securities transactions themselves. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b)
(1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986); see also Exchange Act Release, "Retail Repurchase
Agreements", supra note 42, at 2559-4. The SEC declared in this Release that:
The economic realities of traditional repurchase agreements suggest that such
agreements are not themselves separate securities. For purposes of the federal se-
curities laws, however, they are deemed to involve the purchase and sale of the
U.S. government securities to which they relate. As a result, the antifraud provi-
sions of such laws would apply to the offer, sale and purchase of U.S. government
securities occurring in connection with traditional repurchase government securi-
ties occurring in connection with traditional repurchase agreements.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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the position that a repo should not be characterized as a loan.4 6
B. Repos as Separate Securities
Traditionally, the SEC has wavered between categorizing re-
pos either as separate securities or as a purchase and sale of securi-
ties underlying the agreement.47 If classified as a separate security,
repurchase agreements would be subject to the time consuming
and expensive registration procedures required of separate securi-
ties under the Acts.48 Consequently, the Commission has moved
towards categorizing repos as a purchase and sale of the securities
which underlie the repurchase agreement.49 In an amicus curiae
brief field in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Secur-
ities Corp.,50 the SEC examined the statutory definitions of "secur-
ity" given in section 2(1) of the Securities Act"' and section
3(a)(10) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 52 and concluded that
48 See, e.g., Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986) (Nos. 85-
7827, 85-7865, 85-7929) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (SEC argued that repos should be
characterized as securities), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
47 Compare Brief for Appellant, SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986)
(No. 85-6111) (SEC apparently argued that a repo should be characterized as a security)
with Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46 (SEC maintained that repos should not be charac-
terized as separate securities but as involving the purchase and sale of the securities under-
lying the agreement).
48 See Exchange Act Release, "Retail Repurchase Agreements", supra note 42, at 2559-
4 n.7; see also T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 27-84 (discussion of registration requirements in
federal securities laws).
"9 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46.
80 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
51 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 2(1) of the Securities Act states in
part:
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights. . .or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act
states in part:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
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a repurchase agreement is not a "security" for purposes of the
Acts. 3
Although repos arguably may be considered notes because
they involve a commitment on the part of one party to pay a fixed
sum of money to repurchase the underlying securities, they still
cannot be viewed as securities in the form of "notes. '5 4 In Ex-
change National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.,5  the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that a party claiming that a note is not within
the 1933 Securities Act "has the burden of showing that 'the con-
text otherwise requires.' "56 The court's discussion implies that a
note is presumed to be a security.51 However, in Exchange Na-
tional Bank, Judge Friendly stated that "note[s] which simply
[formalize] an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course
of business (particularly if. . .it is collateralized)" should not be
considered securities.58 Such notes strongly resemble repurchase
agreements, thus it is unlikely that any court would define a repo
trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security . . . or in general, any instru-
ment commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. The Supreme Court has stated that, despite the variations of the definitions of security
given in the Acts, the definitions should be considered "virtually identical." See Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
51 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 8-18.
See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138
(2d Cir. 1976) (enumerating types of notes outside statutory definition); see generally Lip-
ton & Katz, "Notes: Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974)
(discussing when collateralized notes are not to be viewed as securities); Note, The Eco-
nomic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 400 (1982) (outlining judicial defi-
nitions that cause notes to fall outside the purview of securities regulations).
544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1137-38 (emphasis in original).
', See id. at 1138. In this case, however, the Second Circuit gave various examples of
notes which would not be securities:
[Tihe note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a
home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term
notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (par-
ticularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized). When a
note does not bear a strong family resemblance to these example and has a matur-
ity exceeding nine months, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act should generally be held to
apply.
11 Exchange Nat'l Bank, 544 F.2d at 1138.
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as a security in the form of a note."
It is submitted that repurchase agreements also cannot be
viewed as a "right to subscribe to or purchase a security" so as to
allow a characterization of repos as separate securities. Parties to
repurchase agreements do not have a right or option to sell or
purchase securities.60 On the contrary, the participants are con-
tractually obligated either to sell to or purchase from each other
securities of the same class and issuer on an agreed-upon later
date.6 In this context, repos resemble mandatory forward con-
tracts in which the parties respectively agree to purchase or sell
securities on an agreed-upon future date.6 2 In cases involving for-
ward contracts pertaining to Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation certificates ("Ginnie Maes"), courts have viewed such for-
" See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 13-14. Traditional repurchase agreements
involve transactions which bind investors and dealers within the ordinary course of the se-
curities business. See id. Additionally, the size of repurchase transactions, their short terms,
bargained-for prices, and non-assignability warrant the conclusion that repos should not be
held to be notes within the meaning of the securities laws. See id. at 14.
These same considerations warrant the conclusion that a traditional repurchase agree-
ment should not be deemed a security in the form of an "evidence of indebtedness." Cf.
United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 736 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972)
(evidence of indebtedness defined as "contractual obligation to pay in the future for consid-
eration presently received"); United States v. Jones, 182 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Mo. 1960)
(evidence of indebtedness found to exist where instrument contained "on its face evidence
of an obligation as to which some innocent person would act in relation to the terms
thereof").
The SEC has maintained the position that retail repurchase agreements are securities
in the form of notes, evidences of indebtedness, and debentures. See Exchange Act Release,
"Retail Repurchase Agreements", supra note 42, at 2559-3. However, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between retail repos and the traditional wholesale repos previously discussed. Re-
tail repos are primarily offered to the general public for investments of less than $100,000
for terms of not less than ninety days. Id. at 2559-2. The SEC compared the two forms of
repos stating:
[T]raditional repos usually have a shorter duration (one day is not untypical, in-
volve larger amounts (one million dollars is not uncommon), are privately negoti-
ated rather than mass marketed, and involve entire government securities which
often are delivered directly to the purchaser; an event which rarely, if ever, occurs
in a retail repo transaction.
Id. at 2559-4. See generally Lowy, Special Rules Applicable to Retail Repurchase Agree-
ments, in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 251 (detailed discussion of retail repurchase
agreements).
11 See In re Fin. Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 524-26 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Financial
Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 634 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Schweickart,
413 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See Novikoff & Julis, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements Under Arti-
cles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 79, 81.
2 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 11; see also SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc.,
678 F.2d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 1982) (definition of forward contract).
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ward contracts as involving only a purchase or sale of the
underlying government securities and not as separate securities
themselves . 3 As Ginnie Maes are exempted from the Securities
Act registration requirements, 4 so are the forward contracts in-
volving them. 5 Ginnie Maes are, however, subject to the anti-fraud
provisions of both Acts. 6 It is submitted that repos, which resem-
ble forward contracts, should enjoy similar treatment from the
SEC.
C. Repos as a Purchase and Sale of Securities Underlying the
Agreement
The SEC does not maintain that repurchase agreements qual-
ify as securities under the Acts,6  or that it is necessary to treat
them as separate securities in order to protect investors."8 The
SEC would treat repos as transactions occurring "in connection
with" the purchase and sale of the securities underlying the agree-
ment, so that they would still be subject to anti-fraud regulation.6
'3 See, e.g., Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582, 588-89 (7th Cir.
1984) (purchase of Ginnie Maes is "in connection with" purchase of underlying securities
but forward contracts not separate securities); SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 678 F.2d 649, 652
(6th Cir. 1982) (Ginnie Mae forward contract not a security); see generally In re Legel,
Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 323-24 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (description and uses of
Ginnie Maes).
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides, in
pertinent part, that "the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any. . . security
issued or guaranteed by the United States." Id.
"I See id.; see also LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819,
832-33 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (standby commitment to purchase Ginnie Maes enjoys Ginnie
Maes' exemption from registration). Cf. Diamant Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,447, 76,818, 76,819 (Sept. 11, 1980) (if under-
lying security exempted from registration by statute, then repo should be similarly
exempted).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), (c) (1982). Exemptions in section 4 of the Securities Act do
not apply to statutes regarding fraudulent interstate transactions. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §
78j (1982) (no provision in Exchange Act making anti-fraud provision inapplicable for regis-
tration-exempt security); infra note 71 (discussion of registration requirements as applied to
repo market).
17 See supra notes 47-66; infra notes 68-70 and accompanying texts.
s See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 18; Note, supra note 42, at 423.
" See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 18-19. The SEC does want to ensure re-
purchase agreements are within the anti-fraud protections of the federal securities laws. Id.
The SEC believes that courts can achieve this goal without characterizing traditional repos
as separate securities, by treating fraud in repo transactions as occurring "in connection
with" the purchase and sale of the underlying securities. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release,
"Retail Repurchase Agreements", supra note 42, at 2559-2 (anti-fraud provisions apply to
repos "in connection with" government securities) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 231.6351 (1986)).
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The SEC thus would not subject repurchase agreements to the
burdensome registration procedures required of separate securities
under the Acts. 70 It is submitted that the SEC approach is superior
in that it would have the dual benefit of protecting investors by
subjecting repos to the anti-fraud provisions of the Acts without
having the deleterious effects of invoking the registration provi-
sions of the 1933 Act.7'
JUDICIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF REPOS
The federal courts have not consistently followed the Commis-
sion's determination that traditional repurchase agreements are
not securities within the meaning of the Acts.72 The first two cases
directly to address this issue were SEC v. Gomez7 and City of
"0 See supra notes 48-49.
7 See Note, supra note 42, at 419; see also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 19
(requiring registration can have serious effects on "timing and costs of transactions"). Alter-
natively, repos might be characterized as separate securities but simultaneously declared
exempt from registration requirements on the basis of the government securities exemption
of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). The SEC has not issued consistent
opinions as to whether repos are exempt from registration. Compare Exchange Act Release,
"Retail Repurchase Agreements", supra note 42, at 2559-4 n.7 (SEC statement that regis-
tration provisions of securities laws inapplicable to repos) with Amicus Curiae Brief, supra
note 46, at 19 n.37 ("The Commission expresses no views on whether traditional repos gen-
erally would be exempt from registration").
Repurchase agreements also may be exempt from registration by the private placement
exemption of the Securities Act, which exempts "transactions not involving any public offer-
ing." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). The exemption primarily was enacted because Congress
wanted to avoid time-consuming and expensive registration requirements if the Securities
Act's application would not serve any practical need for either the participants or the gen-
eral public. See T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 128-29 (citing H.R. REP No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-29 (1933)). The exemption applies only to specific transactions involving the very
few sophisticated investors whose bargaining positions are so strong that they do not need
federal registration protection. See id. at 128.
Traditional repurchase transactions could fall within the private placement exemption
if they satisfy the requirements of the SEC's safe harbor rule. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. §
230.506 (1986). Rule 506 exempts offers and sales of securities from registration when there
are no more than thirty-five purchasers. Id. § 230.506(b)(2). When traditional repurchase
agreements are offered to or entered into with more than thirty-five investors, which is not
atypical, the private placement exemption would not apply. See id. Therefore, if a repo was
deemed to be a security and if the offer or sale was made to more than thirty-five purchas-
ers, the repo would have to comply with the registration provisions of the securities laws.
See id. Registration would, in effect, cripple the repo market, as repos are attractive invest-
ments because of their liquidity and case of transaction. See supra notes 30-35 and accom-
panying text.
712 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
73 [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91 92,013, at 91,018 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1985).
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Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co.,74 in which both courts consid-
ered repurchase agreements to be "securities" entitled to anti-
fraud protection. 5 Both courts further found that the alleged acts
satisfied the "in connection with" requirement of the anti-fraud
provisions.7 6 However, these two cases only examined whether re-
pos were subject to the anti-fraud provisions, and not whether they
were subject to the registration requirements.7 It is submitted that
these courts characterized repurchase agreements as "securities"
without any conscious appreciation of the registration implications.
Neither opinion recognized that classification, either as a separate
security or as a purchase and sale of the underlying security, would
bring about the same desired result in the anti-fraud context, but
would bring about entirely undesired and different results in the
registration context. It is therefore suggested that these opinions
have value only insofar as they make it clear that repos are not to
be characterized as collateralized loans 8 and that the SEC does
74 621 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
7' See Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,019 (repos that "formed the basis ... [for
the] transactions are securities"); City of Harrisburg, 621 F. Supp. at 470 (repo agreements
considered to be securities).
76 See City of Harrisburg, 621 F. Supp. at 470-72; Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
91,019; In Gomez, the complaint alleged that Gomez, a certified public accountant and part-
ner of an accounting firm, "knowingly and with the intent to defraud purchasers of securi-
ties," made either false statements or omitted material facts relevant to the financial condi-
tion of a holding company that dealt exclusively in U.S. government securities. See Gomez,
[1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,018. The SEC claimed that Gomez violated sections 17(a)(1),
(2) and (3) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1),(2), (3) (1982); section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5 (1986) (the anti-fraud provisions) See Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,018.
These alleged acts satisfied the "in connection with" requirements of the securities laws. Id.
In City of Harrisburg, the court followed the reasoning of Gomez and considered repos
to be securities. City of Harrisburg, 621 F. Supp. at 469-70. The "in connection with" re-
quirement was met as the brokers allegedly misrepresented or omitted certain facts concern-
ing the repo transaction. See id. at 471. See also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773
(1979) (broker held subject to anti-fraud provisions for placing sell orders for shares he did
not own, seeking to profit by purchasing below sale price; fraud held to be "in the offer and
sale" of securities). Cf. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) (fraud "in connection with" purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury
bonds subject to anti-fraud provisions); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975) (fraud "in connection with" purchase
and sale of securities by publicly held mutual fund subject to anti-fraud provisions). See
generally infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text (further discussion of "in connection
with" requirement).
" See City of Harrisburg, 621 F. Supp. 469-72; Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
91,018-19.
7' See City of Harrisburg, 621 F. Supp. at 470-72; Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
91,019; The Gomez court found repos to be securities for the purpose of denying a motion to
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have the authority to supervise repo transactions.
THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT OF RULE 10b-5
As previously noted, the SEC relies on the "in connection
with" language of the anti-fraud statutes to bring repurchase
agreements within the ambit of those provisions.79 Specifically,
Rule 10b-5 requires the alleged fraud to be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."80 If a transaction fails to meet
this requirement, the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws
cannot be invoked.81 In Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,s2 the Second Circuit restrictively interpreted the "in connec-
tion with" requirement, holding that it would not be satisfied un-
less the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant misrepresented
the value of the securities in question.8 s Generally, any fraud or
misrepresentation likely to be perpetrated in a repurchase transac-
tion would relate to the financial condition of the government se-
curities dealer, and not to a misrepresentation of value. 4 Yet,
quash. Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,019. Thus ruling might be more useful as an
explicit rejection of repos as collateralized loans, a characterization that is widespread. See,
e.g., United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 300 n.4 (7th Cir.) ("in substance a secured
loan"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (repo a "short-term" collateralized loan); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Hous-
ton, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 577, 404 N.E.2d 726, 728, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 (1980) ("in essence, a
loan transaction"). While such a classification may accurately describe the transaction from
an economic perspective, see Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; Dunning, Diagrams Outlining
Repurchase Transactions, in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 13, 14, this designation can
insulate repos from the reach of the Securities Act's anti-fraud provisions. See Bellah v.
First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 18-19.
80 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). See supra note 40 (text of Rule 10b-5).
OX See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
82 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
83 See id. at 943. The court held that the "in connection with" requirement could not
be satisfied by a mere allegation that the defendant committed a prohibited act in a trans-
action of which a pledge of securities was a part. Id.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had stated "we need not decide whether misrep-
resentations or ommissions involved in a securities transaction, but not pertaining to the
securities themselves, can form the basis of a violation of [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)]." Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429 n.6 (1981). But cf. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) (injury resulting from "deceptive
practice touching" sale of securities actionable). However, the Second Circuit believed
Bankers Life "pushed the perimeters rather far," and thus did not feel constrained by it.
See Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 943 (quoting ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1014 n.26
(2d Cir. 1975)).
8 See.City of Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463, 466 (M.D. Pa. 1985)
(dealer allegedly promised to deposit repos in a segregated account but did not); SEC v.
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under the restrictive interpretation advanced by the Chemical
Bank court, such schemes involving repos would not be subject to
the anti-fraud provisions because the fraud would not relate to the
value of the securities in question."5
The Chemical Bank interpretation of the "in connection with"
requirement was followed and extended to repos in SEC v. Drys-
dale Securities Corp.,s6 in which misrepresentations concerning
the financial condition of a government securities dealer were
made to induce investors to enter into repurchase agreements.8 " In
Drysdale, the district court held that such misrepresentations were
not "in connection with" the purchase and sale of securities since
they did not concern the securities' value; 8 therefore, repos were
"indistinguishable from collateralized loans."' 9
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and reinstated the complaint based upon the fed-
eral securities lawsY0 The court held that the alleged misrepresen-
Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,013, at 91,018 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1985) (false
statements or omissions regarding financial well-being of dealer); SEC v. Drysdale Sec.
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (misrepresentations related to capitalization of
dealer), rev'd, 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894 (1986).
Cf. Hadsell v. Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1973). In Hadsell, the plaintiff purchased
corporate securities in a repurchase agreement from another corporation, not a government
securities dealer, which later turned out to be insolvent. Id. at 124. The plaintiff relied on a
fraudulently filed financial statement that indicated that the seller was in good financial
standing and thus capable of repurchasing the corporate securities. Id. at 124-25. The court
rejected the seller's argument that there was no fraud "in connection with" the purchase of
securities. Id. at 127.
85 See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 785
F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894 (1986); Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d
105, 108 (2d Cir. 1986); Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 943; see also Head v. Head, 759 F.2d
1172, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1985) (no misrepresentation as to value; thus no cause of action
under Rule 10b-5). But cf. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) ("a
10b-5 action will survive even though the fraudulent scheme or device is unrelated to 'in-
vestment value' ").
86 606 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2894 (1986).
87 See id. at 297. The SEC brought this action against the dealer, three of its officers,
and Warren Essner, a partner at the accounting firm responsible for the preparation of the
allegedly false and misleading financial statements for Drysdale. SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp,
785 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1986). Essner's reports failed to disclose Drysdale's enormous capi-
tal deficit and that much of Drysdale's capital was held subject to outstanding loans. Id. at
40. Essner knew that the reports he prepared would be used to encourage investors to do
business with Drysdale. Id. Losses to investors stemming from this fraudulent scheme were
approximately $300 million. Id. at 39.
" Drysdale, 606 F. Supp. at 299.
See Drysdale, 785 F.2d at 40.
go Id. at 39.
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tations concerning the government securities dealer's financial con-
dition were sufficiently "in connection with" the purchase and sale
of the underlying government securities and were therefore subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.91 The
court distinguished the Chemical Bank decision by discussing the
significant differences between repos and the traditional, short-
term collateralized loans at issue in Chemical Bank.9 2 In a stan-
dard collateralized loan, the lender holds the collateral as security
and can sell it only if the borrower defaults.9 3 Repo "lenders," on
the other hand, acquire immediate ownership rights in the securi-
ties received and can dispose of them as they wish.9 4 In fact, until
"' Id. at 41-42. The Drysdale court analogized to United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768 (1979), and A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), when it held that
misrepresentations concerning repurchase agreements, although not involving the value of
the securities themselves, were nevertheless "in connection with" the purchase and sale of
the underlying government securities and therefore subject to the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws. See id. at 42.
In Perlow, the scheme involved placing orders for the purchase of corporate stock with
the intent to pay for them only if their market value increased by the payment date. Perlow,
375 F.2d at 396. The scheme was held to be "in connection with" the purchase and sale of
securities, despite the fact that the misrepresentation involved did not relate to the value of
the securities. Id. In Naftalin, a broker placed sell orders for shares he fraudulently claimed
he owned, with the hope of profiting by actually purchasing the shares later in anticipation
of a decline in prices. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 770-71. The fraud was held to occur "in" the
offer and sale of securities. Id. at 773.
In Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971), the Supreme Court construed the "in connection with" requirement broadly when it
stated:
Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there
was a "sale" of a security and since fraud was used "in connection with" it, there
is redress under § 10(b) ....
The crux of the present case is that [the plaintiff] suffered an injury as a
result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor.
Id. at 12-13. Essentially, Bankers Life interpreted "in connection with" as requiring only a
loose connection, as opposed to a direct relationship, between the allegedly fraudulent con-
duct and the sale of securities. See id.; see also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18
(2d Cir. 1981) (phrase construed "flexibly" so as to include any deceptive practice "touch-
ing" securities' sale); Note, The Pendulum Swings Further: The "In Connection With" Re-
quirement and Pretrial Dismissals of RulelOb-5 Private Claims for Damages, 56 Tax. L.
REv. 62, 67 (1977) (any deceptive practice imposes liability).
92 SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Cop., 785 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894
(1986).
'" See id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-207(1) (1978) ("secured party must use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral"); U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(e) (1978) ("the secured party
may repledge the collateral upon terms which do not impair the debtor's right to redeem
it").
, Drysdale, 785 F.2d at 41. In SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
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the repo buyer is obliged to deliver the securities for repurchase,
he may freely deal the collateral . 5 Consequently, the court deter-
mined that repos should not be characterized as collateralized
loans. 96 Such a classification would have prevented enforcement of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws against repo
issuers.97 For this reason, characterization of repos as loans, for
purposes of the federal securities laws, has not been judicially
upheld."e
The Drysdale court, like other courts that have examined the
status of repos in relation to the anti-fraud provisions of the secur-
court stated:
Repos customarily provide for a right of substitution, which means that the lender
need not resell the identical securities purchased, but may substitute different se-
curities of the same issues. Thus, the lender is not required to safekeep the collat-
eral, but may sell, pledge, use or dispose of it in any manner for any purpose, so
long as he resells acceptable securities on the repurchase date.
Id. at 469 (footnote omitted).
95 See M. STIGUM, supra note 20, at 41; supra note 94 and accompanying text.
" Drysdale, 785 F.2d at 41-42.
97 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). These laws ap-
ply only to securities or transactions "in connection with" securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77q(a), 78j(b). However, commercial loans are not securities and therefore are not governed
by these provisions. See Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974).
98 See Drysdale, 785 F.2d at 41-42. Whether a repurchase agreement would be charac-
terized as a loan appears to depend on the context in which the characterization is made.
See Hirschberg, Issues Which Frequently Arise in Structuring and Documenting Commer-
cial Repurchase Transactions, in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 213, 217-20.
In the context of the tax laws, repurchase agreements have been held to be secured
loans, with the effect that the lender is not treated as the owner of the underlying securities
for tax purposes. See, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th
Cir. 1972) (bank not entitled to tax exemption on interest earned on municipal bonds used
in repos); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir.) (as repo
considered secured loan bank not entitled to tax exemption for interest earned), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 452-53 (5th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). But see Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States,
551 F.2d 832, 843 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (mere option to repurchase characterized as sale-repurchase
agreement and not secured loan.)
In the context of the bankruptcy laws, there is not definitive characterization of repur-
chase transactions. Compare Financial Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 634 F.2d 404,
404-05 (8th Cir. 1980) (one week repurchase transaction involving U.S. Treasury bills held a
sale and agreement to repurchase) and Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (repos treated as purchase and sale in bond transaction) with In
re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982) (bench decision) (repo a
secured loan and the securities merely collateral) (cited in A. Levin & J. Donovan, Repur-
chase Agreements After the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, REPURCHASE AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 143, 146 (Course Handbook
Series No. 368, 1985). See generally Note, Repurchase Agreements and the Bankruptcy
Code: The Need for Legislative Action, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 828 (1984) (detailed discussion
of repurchase agreements in the context of bankruptcy laws).
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ities laws, did not directly address the issue of whether repos
should be subject to the registration requirements of the securities
laws.99 The cumbersome registration requirements would, if ap-
plied to repos, result in an increase in transaction costs and a loss
of liquidity which would most likely cause the destruction of the
repo market.100 Consequently, it is suggested that repos be charac-
terized as transactions "in connection with" the purchase and sale
of the securities underlying the agreement, thereby exempting
them from the extensive registration requirements.
CONCLUSION
A traditional repurchase agreement may be characterized as a
loan, as a separate security, or as a purchase and sale of the securi-
ties underlying the agreement. Characterization as a loan, however,
would have the undesirable effect of leaving investors unprotected,
by exempting repos from the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws. Classification as separate security would also be unattractive
because it would subject repos to the delay and expense of comply-
ing with the Securities Act's registration requirements. Recently,
as an alternative approach, the SEC and the courts have character-
ized repos as a separate purchase and sale "in connection with" the
securities underlying the agreement. Characterization of repur-
chase agreements as separate purchases and sales of the underlying
government securities is the most logical approach. Such a charac-
terization will help maintain the vitality of the repo market by
protecting investors from fraud, while not requiring repo issuers to
register their transactions with the SEC.
Howard R. Schatz
" See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894
(1986); City of Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Pa. 1985); SEC v.
Gomez, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 92,013 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1985).
100 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at 19.
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